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Abstract: This paper reports on experiments testing the viability of markets for 
cheap-talk information. We find that the level of trade in these markets is very 
small and eventually vanishes. Sellers provide low-quality information even when 
doing so does not increase their monetary payoff. This contributes to the low 
demand in the market for information. Moreover, we observe the same very low 
level of activity in the market for information when sellers face no conflict of 
interest and the noise in the quality of the transmitted information is much lower. 
Hence, we argue that the collapse of the market for information is a demand 
phenomenon, and even small uncertainty over the quality of information seems to 
have a large impact. 
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Information transmission is common in economic life. Transmission occurs even 
when it is possible to transmit only soft/unverifiable information and when the incentives 
of senders and receivers do not align. Potential competitors sometimes share information, 
for example, when recruiters discuss the characteristics of individuals whom they would 
both like to hire or when corporate raiders discuss potential takeover targets. The 
drawback of sharing information in this way is that conflicts of interest may make the 
sources unreliable. However, when information is costly to acquire, market participants 
can benefit by sharing, perhaps in return for some payment, the information they have 
acquired – even though the information shared may be noisy – thereby creating a market 
for information. The lower the rivalry of information or the higher its cost, the more likely 
soft information is sold and transmitted. The literature on cheap-talk games, starting with 
Crawford and Sobel (1982), has established a set of conditions for soft strategic 
information transmission. 
This paper reports on a series of experiments testing the viability of a market for 
information. From a theoretical point of view, the game we designed has an equilibrium 
where information is indeed exchanged. In addition, previous experimental evidence 
shows that real subjects often tell the truth, even against their self-interest. This suggests 
that they derive utility from not breaching a truth-telling norm, and it could strengthen 
the likelihood of a market for information arising. Thus, both theoretical and experimental 
reasons support the feasibility of a market for information where the information is 
unverifiable. In our experiments, however, we find that markets for information are 
fragile when information is soft. Given the above, this finding is somewhat in contrast 
with the theoretical predictions and previous experimental evidence. Moreover, we find 
that when the information exchanged is verifiable, fragility no longer obtains, as the level 
of activity in the market for information is in line with the theoretical predictions. When 
information is soft, subjects show a considerably weaker willingness to pay for 
information, and there is little information exchange. This is due to a lack of trust in 
information from nonverifiable sources. We find this is true independently of whether 
there are conflicts of interest between sellers and buyers of information. Hence, the 
fragility can be attributed to the soft nature of the information. 
In our baseline treatment, we use a stylized game in which agents can acquire 
information by paying a fixed cost. Then, they can sell information to others via 
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nonverifiable reports. That is, a seller of information has no commitment to sending 
reports with correct information. What makes the game relevant for our purposes is that 
there is a potential conflict of interest. The seller of information may be able to profit 
directly from the information he acquired by carrying out trades in the market. In that 
case, he has an interest in misleading the buyers of information since his payoff is 
decreasing in the number of informed agents. It is important (and also, we argue, realistic) 
that this conflict of interest does not always exist. That is, these profitable opportunities 
arise only with some probability, that is, positive but less than one, and when they do not 
arise, there is no motive to mislead buyers. 
Cabrales and Gottardi (2014), henceforth CG, characterize the ‘informative’ 
equilibria of such a game (when all agents are self-interested and do not have an intrinsic 
motive to tell the truth). In these equilibria, sellers of information send truthful reports 
when they have no opportunities to directly use the information. Otherwise, they send an 
uninformative message. Markets for information are active in equilibrium, provided the 
cost of acquiring information is not too high. Other equilibria exist, where the buyer of 
information expects to obtain uninformative messages. As a result, information is not 
transmitted. 
It is of interest to contrast the findings for the above game with those for an 
alternative game specification. This was the basis for our main experimental control. In 
that alternative specification, the sellers of information can send only truthful messages, 
while the rest of the game remains unchanged. In this situation, when the seller prefers 
that buyers remain uninformed, he can achieve this outcome only by not selling them a 
report. The equilibrium of this game exhibits the same payoffs as the informative 
equilibrium of the game with cheap-talk reports. However, there is no equilibrium with 
outcomes analogous to the babbling equilibrium. We call the game where reports are 
cheap-talk messages and can then be false the game with soft information, or Soft game 
for short. We call the game where reports must be truthful the game with hard information 
or Hard game. 
We perform experiments for both the Hard and the Soft games. The only 
difference between them lies in the quality of information in the reports sold. As argued 
above, the theoretical prediction is that the information transmitted is the same in the two 
cases. The random assignment to the treatment then allows us to attribute the cause of 
differences in outcomes to this feature. We believe that this is a novel experimental 
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design. Indeed, how much information will be sold in the market and the role played by 
the hard vs. soft nature of the information transmitted is an open and relevant empirical 
question. In contrast, the previous theoretical and empirical literature on communication 
games tended to emphasize the alignment of preferences between senders and receivers, 
which we will show is less important in our case. 
Our experimental findings allow us to conclude that the market for information in 
the Soft game does not work well. The quality of information (with respect to the quality 
predicted by the informative equilibrium in the theoretical analysis mentioned above) is 
rather poor. The market is extremely small and fragile. 
We find that there are far fewer purchases of reports from informed players in the 
Soft game and, in the last rounds of the experiment on the game, these purchases decline 
further and practically disappear. This is in contrast with what we get for the Hard game, 
where we observe that the size of the market for information is much larger and, 
importantly, does not decrease as the game is repeated. 
We should point out that the games briefly described above are static. Hence, 
reputational concerns do not affect the choice of sellers about the informational content 
of the reports they send. In the experiment, the games are repeated a few times. Thus, in 
principle, the sellers of information may benefit from creating a reputation for honesty in 
the Soft game. This makes the nonviability of information markets in the laboratory even 
more striking. The experimental results provide a negative reply to our motivating 
question. Despite being “theoretically” possible, markets for information do not develop 
with Soft information. 
Having provided an answer to our main question, we also investigate the 
mechanism leading to this finding. In line with previous literature, we observe many 
truthful messages from sellers of information, even when sending a truthful message 
reduces the gains they can earn from their superior information. This favors the 
emergence of a well-functioning information market. A counteracting effect, however, 
operates in the opposite direction. Sellers of information who cannot profit from it often 
either lie or send uninformative messages. 
The fact that some uninterested sellers are not sending informative messages is a 
novel finding, to the best of our knowledge. To understand this behavior, it is important 
to note the following. When a seller of information cannot profit directly from it and sends 
truthful reports, a receiver may benefit from it. Hence, his expected payoff could be higher 
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than that of the sender. Thus, a possible explanation for the behavior we observe is that 
the seller is envious or nonprosocial. In that case, he may prefer to lie and thereby lower 
the payoff gained by the buyer of information. Of course, alternative explanations are 
possible. For example, a babbling equilibrium could prevail in the message part of the 
game: sellers could randomize their reports or send the same report regardless of the 
information they have. This would also lead to the collapse of the market for information. 
To investigate the determinants of this behavior, we measure the social 
preferences of subjects playing the games. However, there is a low number of purchases 
of information, and thus messages sent, in the Soft game. This makes it quite hard to test 
the hypothesis that the low quality of information arises from envy motives or a lack of 
prosociality. In Cabrales et al. (2016), we analyze a sender-receiver game closely related 
to the message component of the Soft game. In the experimental evidence we obtain for 
that game, we find that social preferences can explain the anomalous, nontruthful 
behavior of senders. However, we cannot unambiguously conclude from this finding that 
the same is true in the situation considered here. The two games still exhibit some 
significant differences. We leave this question for future research. 
The lack of truthfulness in the reports could contribute to the low participation in 
the market for information. However, we argue that this is not the only reason for the low 
level of activity in this market. This emerges from the experimental findings for a variant 
of the baseline treatment, which we call Uninterested. In that treatment, the sellers of 
information cannot profit from using the information directly.1 Hence, a conflict of 
interest between sellers and buyers of information never arises. Because of this, the seller 
has no direct benefit from misinforming the buyers of information. We find that the 
quality of information is indeed significantly higher than in the Soft treatment. Up to 92% 
of the reports are then truthful (instead of approximately only half of the reports in the 
Soft treatment). However, information sales are still rather low, very far below those in 
the most informative equilibrium and significantly below those in the Hard treatment. 
The results obtained for the Uninterested treatment are thus important. They suggest that 
the certainty of having accurate information compared to information whose quality is 
uncertain but still very likely to be accurate has very different implications for agents’ 
willingness to purchase information. This is an important finding. Past theoretical 
                                                 
1 We ran two variants of this treatment, labelled Uninterested-20 and Uninterested-10. See Section 4 and 
Appendix B for details.  
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literature on information transmission, starting with Crawford and Sobel (1992), 
emphasizes that the alignment of interests between the sender and receiver is the key for 
the emergence of communication. We find that the certainty about the accuracy of 
information is more important. 
1.1. Literature 
First, we should mention the seminal work of Crawford and Sobel (1982) on 
strategic information transmission. They study how the alignment of preferences between 
sender and receiver affects information transmission (Sobel (2013) reviews the vast 
theoretical literature that followed).2 With respect to that paper (and the subsequent 
literature), we consider a different and richer game structure. This yields some novel 
results. In particular, the amount of information available to agents is endogenously 
determined. We also allow payments to be required for the receipt of messages. Crucially, 
the alignment of interests between senders and receivers is not commonly known. It 
depends on whether the sender can or cannot directly profit from the information 
acquired, and this is only privately known by the sender. 
The experimental literature on information transmission has concentrated 
primarily on analyzing sender-receiver games à la Crawford and Sobel (1982). A first 
series of papers (e.g., Dickhaut, McCabe and Mukherji (1995), Blume et al. (1998, 2001), 
and Kawagoe and Takizawa (1999)) demonstrates that when the interests of the sender 
and receiver are perfectly aligned (the underlying game is one of common interest), play 
tends to converge to informative/separating equilibria, although other equilibria 
(babbling/pooling) exist. A more recent strand of the literature (see Sánchez-Pagés and 
Vorsatz (2007), Kawagoe and Takizawa (2005), Cai and Wang (2006), and Wang, Spezio 
and Camerer (2010)) finds more evidence of truth-telling than the most informative 
equilibrium in Crawford-Sobel would predict in games in which interests are not perfectly 
aligned, an outcome that can be explained by a truth-telling norm.3 While in our 
experiments we also find some evidence of aversion to lying, we also observe a 
substantial amount of deception/misinformation even when lying does not increase the 
senders’ payoff but reduces that of the receivers. 
                                                 
2 There is also a relevant theoretical literature that studies information transmission when agents may have 
a preference for telling the truth (see Kartik, Ottaviani and Squintani (2007) and Bolton, Freixas and Shapiro 
(2007)).  
3 This behavior could simply be due to pure lie aversion, which, as reported by López-Pérez and Spiegelman 
(2013), is a significant force behind honesty. 
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The paper is organized as follows. The Soft and the Hard games and their 
equilibria are presented in Section 2, while Section 3 describes the experimental design 
and the results. Finally, some robustness checks of our findings are briefly presented in 
Section 4, together with some concluding remarks. The experimental instructions, 
together with the description of the findings for the Uninterested treatments and 
additional results, are collected in the Appendix, available online. 
2. The game and equilibria 
The main objective of this paper is to assess and compare the viability of 
information markets in the presence of soft and ofhard information. To this effect, we 
consider two simple variants of the model proposed in CG. 
There is one object for sale. The object can be of one of 2 possible varieties, 
assumed to be equally likely ex ante. Let 𝜐 ∈ {1,2} be the true variety of the object. There 
are 3 potential buyers. Each buyer 𝑖 ∈ {1,2,3} has utility 200 for one variety 𝜃௜ and 100 
for the other variety. The value of 𝜃௜ can be 1 or 2 with the same probability and is drawn 
independently across types at the beginning of the game; it is buyer i’s private information 
and denotes his type. The object is allocated to buyers via a second-price auction. 
We assume that, to begin with, no trader knows the variety of the object for sale. 
However, before the auction takes place, any buyer can learn the true variety of the object 
by paying a cost c=20. Any agent who pays this cost can then sell a report about the 
information learned. The utility of buyer i is denoted by 𝜋௜ = (100 + 100𝐼௩௜)𝐼௦௜ −
20𝐼௖௜ − 𝑡௜, where 𝐼௦௜ is an indicator variable that takes the value 1 if buyer i gains the 
object and 0 otherwise, 𝐼௩௜ takes the value 1 if the variety of the object equals i’s type and 
0 otherwise, and 𝐼௖௜ takes the value 1 if i acquires information directly and 0 otherwise. 
Finally,  𝑡௜ is the sum of the payment made by player i in the auction and of the net 
payment of the same player to purchase/sell information in the market for reports. An 
important feature of this environment is that, as we will explain below, the preferences of 
the seller and buyers of information are not always in conflict, but since types are 
privately known, it is also not common knowledge whether this is the case. 
To be more precise, the timing of the game is as follows: 
1. Each buyer decides, in a prespecified sequence, whether to pay c to acquire 
information about the object or not. This decision to acquire information is 
observable by all agents. 
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2. All the buyers who paid cost c learn the true variety of the object, and then they 
simultaneously decide whether to sell a report and, if so, post its price 𝑝௜, thus 
becoming sellers of information. 
3. All the buyers who did not acquire information in stage 1 decide, again in a 
prespecified sequence, whether to purchase a report from one or more of the 
agents selling information. These decisions are also commonly observed. 
4. Any seller of information sends a (common) report to all the buyers who 
purchased information from him. 
5. A second-price auction takes place among all buyers to allocate the object. 
We consider two different specifications of this game, which differ by the nature 
of the information that is sold. In the first specification (Soft game), the report is 
unverifiable, a cheap-talk message; hence, the information sold is soft. The set of 
messages available to a seller of information is given by the set of possible varieties of 
the object plus one additional message. We will refer to this last message as the empty 
message, denoted by 0. Thus, the set of messages is as follows: 𝑀 = {0,1,2}. 
In the second specification (Hard game), the seller must truthfully report the true 
variety of the object. In this case, what is sold is hard information. 
We turn next to analyze the equilibria of these two games. Note that they differ 
only in stage 4, when the seller of information may choose the content of the information 
in the Soft game, but not in the Hard game. Our aim is precisely to study the impact of 
this difference and the choice over the content of information transmitted on the viability 
of the information markets and the properties of the allocations that are obtained. To this 
end, we will focus on equilibria in which players use undominated strategies in the auction 
(we refer to them as truthful bidding strategies because each buyer makes a bid equal to 
his expected valuation for the object, conditional on his information). 
We start with the Soft game. By a straightforward reformulation of the analysis in 
CG, we can show that an equilibrium with nontrivial information transmission exists. In 
that equilibrium, sellers of information always tell the truth whenever doing so is an  
agent’s  best response to the other players’ strategies and beliefs (we refer to this as the 
informative equilibrium). Since the information sent in stage 4 is a cheap-talk report and 
babbling equilibria always exist in cheap-talk games (see Crawford and Sobel (1982)), 
the Soft game considered has multiple equilibria. 
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In particular, in the informative equilibrium, sellers of information adopt the 
following message strategy: 
𝑚௜ = ൜
𝜐 𝑖𝑓 𝜐 ≠ 𝜃௜
0 𝑖𝑓 𝜐 = 𝜃௜
                              (1) 
where 𝑚௜  is the report issued by agent i. Therefore, agent i is truthful about the variety of 
the object when this is different from his own type. However, when he likes the object, 
he sends the empty message. 
To understand why this strategy could be optimal, it is useful to examine the nature 
of the possible conflict of interest between the seller and the buyers of information. When 
agent i (the seller) learns that the true variety of the object is not the one he likes, the seller 
does not expect to gain from participating in the auction. This is true whatever the 
information the buyers have. His payoff (as specified in 𝜋௜) is then unaffected by the 
content of the report, and he is thus willing to tell the truth. On the other hand, in the event 
that the seller learns he likes the object, the seller would like to acquire the object in the 
auction and prefers then to send a report that lowers the expected valuation of the buyers. 
In that case, there is a conflict of interest, and agent i would gain by sending a message 
that deceives buyers and induces them to make the lowest bid. Because message strategy 
(1) conveys some information and hence the bids of buyers of information depend on the 
message received, this is achieved by sending the empty message. 
When sellers adopt the strategy in (1), the reports sent have positive informational 
content, and hence, we can show that in equilibrium, buyers agree to pay a positive price 
for them. 
 As we said, other equilibria in which reports are less informative also exist. In 
particular, babbling equilibria, where the message sent is independent of the true type of 
the object and hence the report is totally uninformative, always exist. For example, the 
message strategy can be given by: 
𝑚௜ = 0 for every 𝑣.                       (2) 
In this case, in equilibrium, buyers will not agree to pay a positive price for the reports. 
Proposition 1. 
A) An informative perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the Soft game described 
above exists. In that equilibrium, the sellers of information adopt the 
reporting strategy in equation (1), while buyers choose a truthful bidding 
strategy in the auction. Furthermore, one agent acquires information and 
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always posts a price 𝑝 = 12.5 for a report, which one other agent accepts. 
The object goes either to the seller of information when he likes the object or, 
in the event that the seller does not like it, to the buyer of the report when he, 
in turn, does like it; the price paid is 150, in both cases. If neither of them 
likes it, the third agent acquires the object at a price of 100. 
 
B) Another perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the Soft game also exists where 
the sellers of information adopt the reporting strategy in equation (2) while 
buyers choose a truthful bidding strategy in the auction. Furthermore, one 
agent acquires information, and no reports are sold. The object goes to this 
agent, if he likes it, at a price of 150. If the agent does not like it, one of the 
other agents acquires the object for a price of 150. 
Note that in equilibrium A), the buyer of a report gains from it because it allows him to 
gain the object at a price of 150 when he likes it and the seller of information does not. In 
this event, the buyer pays 150 for an object with a value of 200 for him, a surplus of 50. 
Since the event has probability ¼, a price of 12.5 is indeed the maximum he is willing to 
pay for such report. 
 The payoffs in the informative equilibrium, A), where the market for information 
is active, are as follows. The buyer who acquires information has an expected payoff of 
ଵ
ଶ
(200 − 150) +  12.5 −  20 = 17.5. The buyer who purchases a report has a payoff 
ଵ
ସ
(200 − 150)  −  12.5 = 0. The uninformed buyer has a payoff of ଵ
଼
(200 − 100) =
 12.5. 
The payoffs in equilibrium B), where the market for information is inactive, are 
instead as follows. The informed buyer has an expected payoff of ଵ
ଶ
(200 − 150) −  20 =
5. The other buyers have an expected payoff of ଵ
଼
(200 − 150) + ଵ
଼
(100 − 150) =  0. 
 In addition to the two equilibria characterized in Proposition 1, there is a 
continuum of other equilibria with intermediate levels of information conveyed by the 
seller’s report. For instance, when the seller is not interested in the object, he can tell the 
truth with probability q and send either of the other messages with equal probability 
ଵ
ଶ
(1 − 𝑞), where 𝑞 ≥ ଵ
ଷ
. The price of information in these equilibria ranges accordingly 
from 0 when 𝑞 = 1/3 to 12.5 when 𝑞 = 1. The truthful bids by the agents who buy 
information also vary with q: when the buyer of information receives a message saying 
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the object is of a type he likes, his expected valuation and hence the agent’s truthful bid 
decrease with q, from 200 when 𝑞 = 0 to 150 when 𝑞 = 1/3. When the buyer of 
information receives a message saying the object is of a type he does not like, his truthful 
bid increases with q, from 100 when 𝑞 = 0 to 150 when 𝑞 = 1/3.4 
In spite of this multiplicity of equilibria, we should point out that the presence of 
an even very small cost of not telling the truth (as in Kartik (2009)), either from an 
intrinsic disutility or from fear of being caught and punished, would select the equilibrium 
in Proposition 1, point A. 
In the Hard game, there is no issue regarding the quality of the information 
conveyed by the reports. Hence, the different incentives of the seller to transmit 
information when he likes or does not like the object affect his decision on whether or not 
to sell the information. We can show the following: 
Proposition 2. There exists a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the Hard game 
described above in which buyers choose a truthful bidding strategy in the 
auction. In this equilibrium, one agent acquires information, and when he 
does not like the object, the agent posts a price 𝑝 = 25 for a report, which 
one other agent accepts. If the agent likes the object, he does not post a price. 
The object goes to the seller of information if he likes it, and otherwise to the 
buyer of the report if he, in turn, likes it, at a price of 150. If neither of them 
likes it, the third agent gets the object at a price of 100. 
Note that despite the high price at which information can be sold, the seller still 
prefers not to sell information in the event that he likes the object. Furthermore, there is 
                                                 
4 Note that we would obtain very similar behavioral properties to those of the equilibria just described, with 
regard to information transmitted, prices of reports and auction bids, in the following situation: senders of 
information adopt a reporting strategy as in (1) but with mistakes, in the spirit of a quantal response 
equilibrium. Specifically, sellers follow the strategy specified in (1) with probability 1 − 𝜀, and with 
probability 𝜀/2, they send one of the other two reports. The level of the truthful bids varies with 𝜀 in the 
same way as we saw truthful bids vary with q in the equilibrium described in the main text (just replace 
1 − 𝜀 where we wrote q). The price of information also varies from 0 when 𝜀 = 2/3 to 12.5 when 𝜀 = 0. 
The main difference arises because, when the reporting strategy entails mistakes, as above, the sender 
sometimes does not send an empty message when he likes the object. This decreases his/her payoff from 
the auction in that event. While his expected payoff from the auction is 50/2 when the seller randomizes in 
the reports he sends when not interested in the object, in the presence of trembles his payoff is 
1
2










no equilibrium where the seller always sells information, regardless of what the beliefs 
off the equilibrium path are.5 
It is important to point out that in the equilibrium described in Proposition 2, both 
the allocation and the expected payoffs are the same as in the informative equilibrium of 
the Soft game described in Proposition 1, point A. Thus, in the environment considered, 
the soft or hard nature of the information should have no effect on either the market 
outcome or the performance of the market for information if the informative equilibrium 
obtains in the Soft game. Hence, according to the theory, a difference between hard and 
soft information would arise only if a different equilibrium were to prevail in the Soft 
game, an outcome that is not, however, robust to the possibility that individuals 
experience an arbitrarily small cost from not telling the truth. In what follows, by 
theoretical predictions, we refer to the case where the informative equilibrium obtains in 
the Soft game. 
 
3. The experiment and the results 
3.1. Design of the experiment 
At the beginning of the experiment, subjects are divided into groups of three 
individuals. The subjects in any given group interact for 20 iterations of the game, and 
this feature is common information. Additionally, within each group of three subjects, 
each individual is randomly assigned a player position (1, 2 or 3) that remains fixed 
throughout the experiment. 
We consider two main treatments (which we label Soft and Hard), where we 
implement the Soft and Hard games described in Section 2. Players are informed that, in 
each round, they will have the opportunity to buy an object by bidding in an auction. The 
object can be either green or orange (its color is randomly drawn at the beginning of the 
round with equal probability). Similarly, each player has a randomly assigned color for 
the round (also green or orange, with equal probability). The object has a value of 200 
ECUs (experimental currency units) for a player if it is of his assigned color and of 100 
                                                 
5 On the other hand, an equilibrium where the seller never sells information does exist, supported by the 
out-of-equilibrium belief that a sale comes from a seller who likes the object. Such an equilibrium, however, 
does not survive the intuitive criterion.  
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ECUs otherwise. At the beginning of every round, each player is endowed with 250 ECUs 
and is informed of his assigned color but not of others’ colors or of the color of the object. 
In every round, there are five stages. In the first stage, each player decides whether 
to pay 20 ECUs to learn the color of the object. The three players in any group make this 
decision in sequence, with an order randomly drawn at the beginning and then held fixed 
through the experiment, and with each player knowing the decisions of his predecessors. 
In the second and third stages, we have the market for reports. In the second stage, 
each player who paid to acquire the information in stage 1, after learning the true color of 
the object, decides whether to set a price for his report on the color of the object. The 
price can be any integer number of ECUs less than or equal to 20. All sellers of 
information set prices simultaneously. Then, in the third stage, those players who are still 
uninformed decide which of the reports, if any, they want to buy at the indicated price 
(each one of those players can buy at most one report). These decisions are again made 
in sequence, with each player knowing the choices of his predecessors. 
In the fourth stage, the reports are issued. This is the only point where the two 
treatments differ. In the Soft treatment, any sender is free to choose from the following 
reports: “the object is orange”, “the object is green” or “the object is orange or green”. In 
the Hard treatment, the sender must truthfully report the color of the object. 
Finally, in the fifth stage, the auction takes place. The three players simultaneously 
make their bids for the object. A bid can be any number of ECUs less than or equal to 
250. The players know that the highest bidder will obtain the object, earning 200 ECUs 
if it is of his assigned color and 100 ECUs if it is not, and paying a price equal to the 
second-highest bid.6 The remaining bidders neither earn nor pay anything. Then, payoffs 
are realized. 
At the end of each round, each player is informed of his payoff, the true color of 
the object, the bids made by each player, and the player who won the object together with 
the price he paid. At the end of the experiment, subjects are paid their payoffs from 4 
randomly selected rounds at a conversion rate of 100 ECUs = 1 euro. 
We ran four sessions for each treatment at the laboratory of experimental 
economics of the University of Siena (LabSi) in December 2017. A total of 99 subjects 
(51 in Soft and 48 in Hard) participated in these sessions, providing a total of 33 groups 
                                                 
6 In the event of a tie, the acquirer of the object is randomly selected from among the highest bidders. Note 
that in this case, the highest and second-highest bids coincide. 
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(17 in Soft and 16 in Hard). The subjects were recruited from the LabSi pool of human 
subjects, primarily consisting of undergraduate students from the University of Siena. No 
subject was allowed to participate in more than one session. After subjects had read the 
instructions, an experimental administrator read the instructions aloud. Throughout the 
experiment, we ensured anonymity and effective isolation of subjects to minimize any 
interpersonal influences that could stimulate cooperation. The average duration of the 
sessions was 70 minutes (including the reading of instructions but excluding payment 
procedures). The experiment was computerized and conducted using the experimental 
software z-Tree (Fischbacher (2007)). The experimental instructions, translated into 
English, are reported in (online) Appendix A. Table 1 provides a summary of all our 
experiments and treatments. 
Table 1. Experimental data 
Treatment # sessions # groups # subjects 
Soft 4 17 (4+4+4+5) 51 
Hard 4 16 (4+4+4+4) 48 
After the 20 rounds of play, in all sessions, we elicited the subjects’ attitudes 
towards risk and social preferences. We used the risk test proposed by Charness and 
Gneezy (2010). Regarding social preferences, we followed the approach proposed by 
Bartling et al. (2009) to identify prosocial and envious attitudes (see online Appendix E 
for details). 
There is one design feature that deserves an explanation. We have fixed groups, 
and even fixed positions within each group, for the iterations of the game considered in a 
session, unlike in the theoretical benchmark considered in Section 2, where the players 
interact once. We made these choices because this is a complicated experimental design 
from a cognitive perspective, and we wanted to maximize the probability that the players 
learned the best strategies to play the game. This becomes easier when players are playing 
against a single group of players in a fixed position than when they are playing against 
changing opponents and/or changing roles. Obviously, the procedure also has 
disadvantages. The most important is that the repetition of the game may create new 
equilibria, and thus the theoretical benchmark is less clear. However, the main new 
equilibria that may arise are those in which the amount of truth-telling increases because 
of reputational concerns. As we will see, the amount of truth-telling in our results is even 
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smaller than in the informative equilibrium described in Proposition 1, point A. 
Additionally, the dynamic trends that appear in the data are easy to explain using simple 
learning heuristics, without resorting to complicated strategies in the repeated game. 
In this experimental design, the comparison of the Hard and Soft treatments allows 
us to study whether the nature of the information transmitted makes a significant 
difference in terms of the viability of the market for information. 
3.2. Results 
In this section, we present the experimental results for the Soft and Hard 
treatments and compare them with the theoretical predictions reported in Section 2. Table 
2 presents the results concerning the behavior of subjects in the auction in the two 
treatments. In the columns, we report the bids made in the first half (rounds 1 to 10) and 
the second half (rounds 11 to 20) of the experiment. In the rows, subjects are differentiated 
according to their available information: In the first two rows, we report the behavior of 
the informed players, i.e., those who acquired information directly. Specifically, we show 
their average bid when the color of the object coincided with their assigned color (Color 
– Yes) and when it differed (Color – No). The third row displays the average bid of the 
uninformed players (i.e., those who neither acquired information directly nor purchased 
a report). The last rows display the average bid of indirectly informed players (buyers of 
reports) when the report states that the color of the object coincided with their assigned 
color (Color – Yes), when it did not coincide (Color – No) and when the report said “the 
object is orange or green” (we refer to this as the 0 report). We also report the bids that 
would be made by subjects in the equilibrium characterized in Proposition 1, point A, for 
the Soft treatment and Proposition 2 for the Hard treatment, referring to these as 
[Predictions]. 
Comparing the bids between treatments both by period and by the type of 
information that the subjects have available, we do not find systematic significant 
differences (as shown by the reported results of the Mann-Whitney test and t-test). 
Furthermore, in both treatments, we observe a clear learning pattern. When we move from 
the first to the second half of the experiment, bids are increasing, and they are getting 
quite close to the theoretical predictions. This fact holds for all types of available 
information and both treatments. 
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RESULT 1. The bidding behavior in the auction does not differ across 
treatments, and in the second half of the experiment, it is very close (on 
average) to the theoretical predictions. 
Table 2. Average bids by treatment, type of player and block of 10 rounds 
 
  Soft Hard 
 Rounds 1-10 11-20 1-10 11-20 
Informed 
players 
Color - Yes   [Prediction: 200] 152.87 203.22 153.48* 200.87 
Color - No    [Prediction: 100] 91.75 116.51 93.05 120.12 
Uninformed 
players      [Prediction: 150] 115.81 145.22 112.21 143.58 
Buyers of 
report 
Content: Color - Yes  
[Prediction: 200] 135.06 180.14 142.57 206.80^ 
Content: Color - No   
[Prediction: 100] 105.53 136.37 74.37 140.00 
Content:  0                  
[Prediction: 150] 93.94 167.5 N/A N/A 
Soft vs. Hard: Mann-Whitney test significance at *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Soft vs. Hard: t-test significance at ^^^ p<0.01, ^^ p<0.05, ^ p<0.1 
In Table 3, we present, for both treatments, the numbers and relative frequencies 
for the different choices that players could make regarding the acquisition of information: 
(i) to directly acquire information in the first stage (Informed), (ii) to buy a report in the 
third stage (Buy a report) and (iii) to remain uninformed (Uninformed). We again present 
the data separately for the first ten rounds and the second ten rounds of the experiment. 
According to the informative equilibrium of the Soft game described in Section 2, we 
should observe the same number for each of these choices: in each period, one player in 
the group should directly acquire information, one player should buy a report, and one 
player should remain uninformed. According to the equilibrium of the Hard game, in 
each period, one player in the group should directly acquire information, one player 
should remain uninformed, and the remaining player should either buy a report (in case 
the informed player is not interested in the object and, therefore, posts a price) or remain 
uninformed (otherwise). 
In the first half of the experiment, in both treatments, the modal choice was 
acquiring the information directly, followed by the choice of remaining uninformed, with 
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a low frequency of purchasing a report. However, the frequency of buying a report is 
significantly lower in the Soft treatment (9.61%) than in the Hard treatment (19.79%) at 
the 1% level (Mann-Whitney test), and the frequency of acquiring the information directly 
is considerably higher in the Soft treatment than in the Hard treatment (65.29% and 
49.79%, respectively), with the difference being significant at the 1% level (Mann-
Whitney test). 
Table 3. Behavior in information markets in the Soft and Hard treatments – absolute 
number of observations and relative frequencies (% over row total) 
 
Rounds 1-10 Rounds 11-20 

























Soft vs. Hard: Mann-Whitney test significance at *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Periods 1-10 vs. 11-20: Signed-rank test significance at ^^^ p<0.01, ^^ p<0.05, ^ p<0.1 
In the second half of the experiment, we find that differences across treatments 
increase. First, we observe that, whereas the modal choice for the Hard treatment is again 
to acquire the information directly, in the Soft treatment, it becomes to remain 
uninformed. Moreover, we find that in the Soft treatment, the frequency with which 
reports are purchased is markedly reduced (from 9.61% in the first half of the experiment 
to 5.10% in the second half, the difference being significant at the 5% level in the signed-
rank tests), while in the Hard treatment, it remains fairly constant between both halves 
(19.79% and 18.96%, respectively). Hence, the observed difference across treatments of 
the level of activity in the market for reports increases in the second half of the 
experiment. Indeed, in the Soft treatment, we find that the market for reports progressively 
collapses.7 Furthermore, when comparing the first to the second half of the experiment, 
we find systematic and significant differences only for the Soft treatment, so the evolution 
of information acquisition is different across treatments. Overall, these results show that 
the market for reports in the Soft treatment is systematically smaller with respect to the 
Hard treatment and ultimately collapses. 
                                                 
7 We observe a negative trend in the frequency of purchases of reports, which decreases from almost 10% 
in the first 10 periods to slightly above 6% in periods 11-15 and below 4% in the last 5 periods. 
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It is important to note in this context that the market for reports in the Hard 
treatment works even slightly better than in the equilibrium benchmark: we have almost 
20% of agents buying a report, whereas in equilibrium we have 16.6% (recall that, in 
equilibrium, the informed player posts a price only half of the time – when he is not 
interested in the object). 
RESULT 2. In contrast to the theoretical prediction, in the Hard treatment, 
we observe a larger market for reports than in the Soft treatment. Moreover, 
in the Soft treatment, the market for information shrinks over time, whereas 
it remains stable in the Hard treatment. 
This result is one of the most important take-home messages from our paper. The 
difference between the two treatments is exclusively the “hardness” of information. 
According to the theory, this need not make a difference, as in the main equilibrium 
considered for the two games, the level of activity in the market for information, and in 
particular the amount of information transmitted, is the same in both. However, the data 
show that this market is deeper and more robust in the Hard than in the Soft treatment. 
To understand the reasons for this collapse of the market for reports in the Soft 
treatment, one is naturally led to relate it to the informational content of the reports sent. 
In Table 4, we present the reports sent, distinguishing the case in which the seller is 
interested in the object (the object is of his assigned color) and the case in which he is not 
interested.8 We observe that the (average) frequency of truthful reports is 52.11%, very 
close to the theoretical prediction reported in Proposition 1, point A (50%). However, the 
distribution of truthful reports between the case in which the sender is uninterested in the 
object and that in which he is interested is quite different from the predicted distribution. 
In the equilibrium for the Soft game described in Proposition 1, point A, sellers of 
information are always truthful when they cannot benefit from lying. Hence, uninterested 
sellers send a truthful report (i.e., reveal the color of the object), while interested sellers 
send a 0 report. The prediction is thus that all truthful messages occur when the sender is 
uninterested. In the experimental evidence, we observe a significant departure from such 
behavior: while the modal choice of uninterested sellers (43.75%) is indeed to reveal the 
                                                 
8 In Figure F1 in Appendix F, we present the distribution of groups by frequency of truthful reports in the 




true color, there is also a significant fraction of 0-reports (25.00%) and even false ones 
(31.25%). At the same time, interested sellers send truthful reports with a very high 
frequency (58.97%). This has a significant effect on the value a receiver obtains from the 
purchase of information (a truthful message received when the sender is interested in the 
object means that the receiver will face aggressive bidding from the sender in the auction, 
as confirmed by the evidence reported in Table 2).9 
Table 4. Content of the report sent by type of seller (interested in the object or 
uninterested) in the Soft treatment – absolute number of observations and relative 
frequencies (% over row total) 
Seller 0 report False report Truthful report Total 





















The observed reporting choices of sellers of information should be assessed in 
light of the response by buyers of information in terms of their behavior in the auction. 
As shown in Table 2, buyers attribute some (though not full) informative value to a report 
specifying one color of the object and less value to a 0 report. It may also be claimed that 
the observed reporting behavior exhibits some features of either the babbling equilibrium 
or one of the other equilibria described in Section 2 with intermediate degrees of 
information transmitted, especially when the seller of reports is not interested in the 
object. However, the modal choice of truthful reporting when the seller of reports is 
interested in the object is not compatible with these equilibria.10 
RESULT 3. In the Soft treatment, the information conveyed in the reports is 
very noisy and differs sharply from the main equilibrium predictions. 
Uninterested sellers send truthful reports in less than half of the cases, and 
there is an (unpredicted) considerable share of false messages. 
                                                 
9 See Figure F4 in Appendix F for an analysis of the relationship between the size of the market for reports 
and the rate of truthful reporting at the group level in the Soft treatment. We do not find a significant 
correlation.   
10 Relatedly, in Table F3 in Appendix F, we report the average bids in the auction by buyers of reports, 
categorizing them into groups by (average) high and low quality of reports.  
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To gain some understanding of the observed pattern of activity in the market for 
reports and, in particular, of the deviations from the theoretical predictions, in the 
following, we examine the observed behavior in the parts of the game that determine 
supply and demand in this market. We therefore study (i) the behavior of informed agents 
regarding whether to post a price or not (i.e., whether to try to sell information), (ii) the 
asking prices for the reports, and (iii) the prices that are accepted by the buyers of reports. 
To assess the rationale for these decisions, we also analyze the earnings obtained by 
agents in the whole game for the different types of the information that they have. 
In Table 5, we report the data regarding the decision of informed agents on 
whether to post a price. We also report the corresponding behavior in the Hard treatment. 
Table 5. Decision to post a price in the market for reports: relative frequency and total 
number of potential sellers 
 Uninterested Interested 
Soft 0.860 *   193         
0.832 *** 
185 
Hard 0.804  209         
0.635 ^^^ 
203 
Soft vs. Hard: Mann-Whitney test significance at *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Uninterested vs. Interested: Signed-rank test significance at ^^^ p<0.01, ^^ p<0.05, ^ p<0.1 
We find significant differences both between and within treatments: interested 
subjects in the Hard treatment post a price at a frequency that is considerably lower than 
the frequency at which uninterested subjects post a price in the same treatment. They also 
post a price at much lower frequency than interested subjects in the Soft treatment. Note 
that this evidence is in line with the theoretical predictions and could be explained by the 
fact that the only way for interested subjects to avoid revealing information in the Hard 
treatment is to not post a price. 
On the other hand, we observe that all subjects (either interested or not) in the Soft 
treatment, as well as uninterested subjects in the Hard treatment, post a price at a slightly 
lower rate than predicted (100%). It is important to point out that, in relative terms, the 
drop in price posting decisions is not larger but actually smaller in the Soft treatment than 
in the Hard treatment. The presence of a nontrivial fraction of uninterested sellers who 
choose not to post a price in the Hard treatment is particularly difficult to explain, taking 
into account the observed willingness to purchase shown by buyers in that treatment. The 
same can be said of the fact that more than half of the interested sellers in this treatment 
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choose to post a price, though the sale of information leads them to face higher 
competition in the auction (and the theory predicts no sale in such a case).11 
Next, we examine the level of the prices posted for the sale of reports and how 
they evolve throughout the experiment. These prices reflect the sellers’ perception of the 
willingness to pay of buyers for the information conveyed in the reports (as well as, in 
the Hard treatment, the sellers’ willingness to share the information they acquired). Table 
6 presents the average price posted in each round (if more than one price is posted in a 
round, the minimum price). This is done separately for the first and last ten rounds and 
according to whether the seller is interested or uninterested in the object. 
Table 6. Minimum asking price in the market for reports 
 Rounds 1–10 Rounds 11–20 
Soft 8.23 6.49^^ 
Hard 11.29*** 11.40*** 
 Uninterested Interested 
Soft 7.67 7.30 
Hard 11.33*** 11.40*** 
Soft vs. Hard: Mann-Whitney test significance at *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Rounds 1-10 vs. 11–20 and Uninterested vs. Interested: Signed-rank test significance at 
^^^p<0.01, ^^ p<0.05, ^ p<0.1 
We observe a strongly significant difference across treatments. The posted prices 
are higher in the Hard treatment both  when we disaggregate by blocks of periods and 
when we disaggregate by the seller’s interest in the object, and the difference is 
statistically significant. To assess this finding, we should take into account that the 
theoretical prediction of the price in the Hard treatment (when the seller is uninterested) 
is 25, double that in the Soft treatment. At the same time, as already noted, we observe in 
the experiment that sellers also post prices quite often when they are interested, and this 
reduces the value of the information sold.12 The most remarkable finding is that in the 
second part of the experiment, the posted prices are significantly smaller in the Soft 
treatment relative to those in the first part, while in the Hard treatment, they remain 
roughly constant. The decline in posted prices in the Soft treatment is presumably due to 
                                                 
11 In Table F5 in Appendix F, we report, for the Hard treatment, the frequencies of groups by number of 
acquirers of information, and the frequencies of the decisions to post a price. Furthermore, in Table F6, we 
report the frequencies of buyers of reports by number of acquirers of information in the group. See then 
Table D1 in Appendix D for an econometric analysis of the determinants of this behavior. 
12 In fact, if sellers in the Hard treatment were to always post a price, the theoretical value of the 
information would be half, equal to 12.5, which is close to the average observed posted price. 
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the experience of difficulty in selling, which induces sellers to revise their perception of 
buyers’ willingness to pay. Additionally, we note that posted prices do not depend in a 
significant way on whether the subject is interested in the object or not. 
Finally, in Table 7, we present the prices accepted by buyers and the acceptance 
rate (that is, the ratio between the number of accepted prices and the number of posted 
prices, or equivalently, the fraction of sellers succeeding in selling at least one report), 
again for the first and second blocks of ten rounds. These prices reflect the perception of 
buyers of the value of being informed and, in the Soft treatment, their perception of the 
quality of the information transmitted. Hence, they together capture the demand side of 
the market. Comparing the findings in Tables 6 and 7 allows us to relate the level of 
activity in the market for reports in the two treatments to the presence of possible gaps 
between the price at which informed agents are willing to sell information and the price 
at which uninformed agents are willing to buy. 
We see from Table 7 that the Hard treatment displays significantly higher levels 
of accepted prices. Additionally, and more importantly, acceptance rates are higher in the 
Hard treatment. 
Table 7. Accepted price and acceptance rate in the market for reports 
  Rounds 1–10 Rounds 11–20 
Accepted Price Soft 8.35 4.96 Hard 11.19* 11.40*** 
Acceptance Rate Soft 0.24 0.19 Hard 0.55*** 0.56*** 
Soft vs. Hard: Mann-Whitney test significance at *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Rounds 1-10 vs. 11–20: Signed-rank test significance at ^^^ p<0.01, ^^ p<0.05, ^ p<0.1 
These findings are evidence of a lower level of demand for information in the 
Soft treatment. In spite of the observed decline in Table 6 in the level of the prices posted 
by sellers in the Soft treatment, the table above shows that the acceptance rate does not 
increase over time; if anything it appears to slightly decrease. This is clearly related to 
the significantly lower level of information contained in the reports in the Soft treatment, 
as observed in Table 4. This decline reflects the fact that over time, buyers of information 
realize reports are quite noisy and hence are willing to pay less for them. Thus, our 
results suggest that in the Soft treatment, there is a larger gap between the price at which 




It is of interest to relate the observed pattern of accepted prices to the actual 
information contained in the reports purchased and hence to the actual benefit buyers 
receive from purchasing a report. The higher (average) prices in the Hard treatment 
reflect the higher level of information conveyed in the reports in that case. In contrast, 
although the prices in the Soft treatment are below the equilibrium prediction reported in 
Proposition 1, point A, they may still be perceived as being too high relative to the value 
of the reports, given the much larger level of noise present in the content of the reports 
with respect to the equilibrium prediction (as reported in Table 4).13 The former analysis 
reported in Table 5 suggests that the collapse of the market in the Soft treatment cannot 
be attributed to a shortage of decisions to post prices. Hence, the findings of Tables 6 and 
7 on the pattern of prices posted over time and the transactions clearly indicate that such 
a collapse of the market can be attributed to the buyers’ low willingness to pay for 
information, given the noise in the information conveyed, and the sellers’ misperception 
of buyers’ demand. 
Finally, in Table 8, we analyze the subjects’ earnings in the two treatments, 
distinguishing by the type of information available to the subjects and by the time in the 
experiment (first or second block of ten rounds in the experiment).14 In both treatments, 
we find that earnings decline significantly over time for informed players. In addition, we 
do not find systematically significant differences in payoffs for any given role across 
treatments. 
Table 8. Average earnings by treatment, type of available information and rounds 
 Soft treatment 
 Rounds 1–10 Rounds 11–20 
Uninformed 256.60 251.63 
Informed 246.85* 240.26^^^ 
Buyers of reports 245.90 250.54 
 Hard treatment 
 Rounds 1–10 Rounds 11–20 
Uninformed 259.23 246.69 
Informed 259.33 240.35^^^ 
Buyers of reports 252.61 242.54 
Soft vs. Hard: Mann-Whitney test significance at *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
                                                 
13 We further explore the effects of the level of prices posted on the subjects’ decisions to buy reports in the 
econometric analysis reported in Table D1 in Appendix D. This analysis shows that higher prices 
significantly reduce the purchases of reports in both treatments. 
14 See Table F1 in Appendix F for a description of the (gross) earnings in the auction. 
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Rounds 1-10 vs. 11–20: Signed-rank test significance at ^^^ p<0.01, ^^ p<0.05, ^ p<0.1 
If we then compare the differences in earnings between types of players (signed-
rank tests available upon request), we do not find any significant difference in the first 
part of the experiment in either the Soft treatment or in the Hard treatment. On the other 
hand, in rounds 11-20, we find that, in the Soft treatment, the earnings of informed players 
are significantly lower than those of uninformed players (1% level) and those of buyers 
of reports (5% level); in the Hard treatment, the earnings of informed players are also 
significantly lower than those of uninformed players (5% level). No other differences are 
significant. 
These findings could seem puzzling considering the predictions of theory. In all 
the equilibria we characterized for the Soft and Hard games, it is the informed player who 
gets the highest payoff. However, we should point out that the subjects who acquire 
information in the Soft treatment are very rarely able to sell it. Therefore, they bear the 
cost of the acquisition of information and the benefits from the superior information in  
the auction and from the sale of reports  are often not sufficient to cover such  cost . This 
can easily explain the small negative difference we observed in their payoffs relative to 
the ones of players in other roles.  In the Hard treatment, the puzzle can be explained 
because the informed players sell information too often when they are interested in the 
object, relative to the equilibrium predictions, and by so doing they increase the 
competition in the auction. Importantly, this also reduces total surplus in the Hard 
treatment, even though the market for information remains viable in that case, as the 
surplus is “bid away” in the auction and goes instead to the owner of the object.15 
To try to shed additional light on the results, we perform a regression analysis in 
which we relate the behavior in the information market to past behavior by other players 
in the same market and the risk and social preferences of the participants. The two main 
takeaways of this analysis are the following (see Appendix D for all details). The first is 
that the social preferences of subjects appear to be a driver of the observed departures 
from equilibrium behavior in the decision to post a price for information in the Hard 
                                                 





treatment. The other is that the experience of information that is too noisy in the reports 
in the Soft treatment contributes to driving buyers out of the market in that treatment. 
4. Discussion 
We have established with the Hard and Soft treatments that the nature of the 
information that is transmitted makes a significant difference for the viability of a market 
for information. We have also shown that the source of this outcome is a steep decrease 
in the willingness to pay for information in the Soft relative to the High treatment. We 
now deepen the analysis by showing that the reason for this outcome has more to do 
with certainty vs. uncertainty over the quality of information transmitted than with the 
alignment of preferences, as previous theoretical and experimental literature would 
suggest. 
To this end, we also run two other treatments, labeled Uninterested-20 and 
Uninterested-10.  With respect to the baseline of the Soft treatment, in these two 
treatments, we add a fourth player (player 0), who does not participate in the auction (he 
is uninterested in the object) and is the only player allowed to sell reports. In this case, 
the seller of information (player 0) can still lie and send noisy information in her report, 
but unlike in the Soft treatment, she cannot gain any material benefit from doing so, and 
this fact is common knowledge. The difference between these two additional treatments 
lies in the cost to player 0 of acquiring information: while in treatment Uninterested-20 
player 0 has the same cost (of 20) of acquiring information as that of the other players, in 
treatment Uninterested-10, player 0 has a lower cost (of 10) of acquiring information. 
The comparison of these two additional treatments with the previous ones allows 
us to investigate the role played by the presence of a conflict of interest between buyers 
and sellers of reports in the collapse of the market for reports. 
A detailed description of the results for the Uninterested-10 and Uninterested-20 
treatments is reported in Appendix B. Here, we should first highlight the fact that, as we 
observed in the Soft treatment, the market for information also turns out to be very small 
in these two additional treatments. This issue suggests that the conflict of interest is not 
the only determinant of market failure. Indeed, in periods 11-20, the proportion of players 
buying a report is 9.7% in Uninterested-20 and 14.24% in Uninterested-10. The 
difference between the two treatments is statistically significant, but in both cases, the 
amounts are very far below the theoretical benchmark (66.6%; see Appendix B). Again, 
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the low level of activity cannot be attributed to a low number of subjects attempting to 
sell information (in the last ten rounds, the frequency of uninterested player 1 trying to 
sell a report is 40.83% in Uninterested-20 and 81% in Uninterested-10). 
This low demand for reports is important per se but even more so in conjunction 
with the fact that the quality of information is now quite good. We find that 84.06% of 
the reports are truthful in Uninterested-20 and 91.86% in Uninterested-10. Therefore, the 
reason for the lack of trust in reports cannot be that the quality of information is poor. Nor 
are the prices for information particularly high. In the last 10 rounds, the posted prices 
are, on average, equal to 13.54 in Uninterested-20 and to 12.39 in Uninterested-10. The 
latter value is, in fact, not far from the theoretical prediction. This leads to an interesting 
observation. In the Hard treatment (where the quality of information is certain), many 
buyers are willing to purchase information at prices close to the above. 
In the Uninterested treatments, especially in Uninterested-10, the quality of 
information turns out to be very high, though not perfect; nevertheless, the purchases 
made are significantly lower than the theoretical values.16 Thus, it seems that even a small 
amount of uncertainty about information quality can have large effects on information 
markets.17 This might be a potential insight for policy. If small amounts of misinformation 
can lead to a collapse in the market for information, the externalities caused by, for 
instance, false advertising might be higher than we thought. Regulators are, of course, 
aware of the harm of false advertising.18 Our research provides additional theoretical and 
empirical foundations for such concerns. Similarly, our findings also suggest that the 
provisions prescribing firewalls between analysts and traders present in many 
                                                 
16 See Tables B2 and B4 in Appendix B. 
17 This is reminiscent of the findings in Charness et al (2014) in a network setup. In that experiment, when 
players knew the network with certainty, they were able to coordinate on the efficient equilibrium, but when 
there was a minimal amount of uncertainty they coordinated on the inefficient (but more secure) 
equilibrium. 
18 See, e.g., https://europa.eu/youreurope/citizens/consumers/unfair-treatment/unfair-commercial-
practices/index_en.htm for the EU, https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/media-resources/truth-advertising 




regulations19 may not be that effective in sustaining well-functioning markets for 
information. 
To test the robustness of the observed results (primarily those concerning the 
market for reports), we run an additional treatment, denoted Base.20 The Base treatment 
is very similar to the Soft treatment, but with one main difference: subjects that acquire 
the information post prices for reports prior to knowing whether they are interested in the 
object or not (that is, they learn the color of the object only before deciding the content 
of the report).21 We consider this specification because (i) it directly implements the 
theoretical model proposed in CG and (ii) it allows us to see whether the collapse in the 
market for reports observed in the Soft treatment depends on the possible presence of a 
signaling component in the sellers’ decision to sell information (muted in the Base 
treatment by the different assumption regarding the timing of sellers’ decisions described 
above). 
We show in Appendix C (Tables C1-C3) that the main features of the market for 
reports that we observed in the Base treatment are quite similar to those obtained for the 
Soft treatment. We also find that in this case, the market for reports collapses, with a 
negative trend in the number of reports sold over time and with almost no activity in the 
market for reports in the last rounds. Furthermore, the informational content of messages 
in the Base treatment is very poor, as in the Soft treatment, suggesting that this is again 
the key factor driving the failure of the market for reports. The evolution of asked and 





To sum up, in this paper, we experimentally study the viability of markets for 
information where the information transmitted is soft, that is, transmitted via cheap-talk 
                                                 
19 Section 501 of Title V in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (significantly entitled ‘Analysts’ conflicts of 
interest’) requires financial firms to establish specific safeguards to ensure the independence and 
separation of analysts from traders. 
20 We run 4 sessions for a total of 48 subjects (16 groups) that play 20 rounds of the game. 
21 We also use a strategy method for the final auction. 
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reports. In this environment, the game played by agents features equilibria with and 
without information transmission, and hence, an empirical assessment of the viability of 
information transmission seems necessary. Furthermore, previous results in the 
experimental literature on cheap-talk games suggest that subjects in the lab may tell the 
truth even when theory predicts that reports should be uninformative. To assess the role 
played by the soft nature of the information transmitted, we compare the experimental 
results for the game where messages can be false or uninformative with those for an 
analogous game where only hard information can be transmitted; that is, messages need 
to be true. 
We find that in the laboratory, far fewer reports are sold in the game with soft 
information than in the game with hard information. We observe that some agents do 
indeed tell the truth when their monetary payoffs could be increased by sending deceptive 
reports. However, a novel finding in our experiment is that some agents lie when doing 
so does not increase their monetary payoff. This deceptive behavior and, more generally, 
the uncertainty generated by the possible presence of noise in transmitted information is 
one of the main reasons for the collapse of the market for information. 
Our results for the Uninterested treatments allow us to disentangle the role of the 
actual noise present in reports from that of the possible presence of noise. However, 
further research along these lines would be very helpful to shed light on the problem at 
hand. For instance, an open question to investigate is to better understand why subjects 
send false or uninformative messages in cases in which there is an absence of a conflict 
of interest (e.g., false/empty reports sent by uninterested sellers in the Soft treatment) or, 
likewise, why some uninterested players do not post prices in the Hard treatment. 
Our paper provides additional empirical support for existing regulatory policies in 
various areas. For example, our research shows that the alignment of interest between 
buyers and sellers of information is not sufficient to enable a well-functioning market for 
information. Hence, it is unclear whether firewalls between analysts and traders are 
enough to foster markets for information. Another application involves regulatory norms 
concerning truth in advertising. Even though markets for information are pervasive in 
reality, the fragility of this market in our experiments suggests that we should not take 
their existence for granted. Our results tell us that the absence of a conflict of interest 
between senders and receivers and/or a natural tendency toward truth-telling may not be 
enough for the survival of these markets. In our setting, senders of information can even 
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construct reputations, but this is also not enough. Thus, our findings lead us to think that 
we need further research to determine the reasons for the survival of information markets 
in reality. For example, there may be a role for third-party certification (Lizzeri (1999)) 
or even government intervention to enforce accuracy in information transmission (Arrow 
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A) EXPERIMENT INSTRUCTIONS 
A.1 Experiment instructions for the Soft treatment22 
The aim of this experiment is to study how individuals make decisions in certain contexts. 
The instructions are simple. If you follow them carefully you will earn a nonnegligible 
amount of money in cash (euros) at the end of the experiment. During the experiment, 
your earnings will be in ECUs (experimental currency units). Individual payments will 
remain private, as nobody will know the other participants’ payments. Any 
communication among you is strictly forbidden and will result in immediate exclusion 
from the experiment. 
1. The experiment consists of 20 rounds. You will be randomly assigned to a group of 3 
participants. This group is determined randomly at the beginning of the experiment 
and remains the same for all rounds. Moreover, you will be randomly assigned a 
player number within your group: you will be either player 1, player 2 or player 3. 
Your player number will remain the same throughout the experiment. 
2. At the beginning of each round  
a. You will be endowed with 250 ECUs that you can use to make the decisions 
within the round, as explained below. 
b. You will be assigned a color (which will be immediately revealed to you) whose 
value for you is explained below. 
3. At each round, you and the other players in your group will have the possibility to 
buy one object, by bidding in an auction (the auction rules will be detailed below). 
There will be one auctioned object, which can be either orange or green. The earnings 
of a player in case of obtaining the auctioned object depend on the color of the object:  
- If the object is equal to the player’s assigned color, then the player will earn 200 
ECUs.  
- If the object is different from the player’s assigned color, then the player will earn 
100 ECUs.  
                                                 
22 We omit the experiment instructions of the Uninterested and Base treatments, which are variations of the 
instructions of the Soft treatment (as explained in Sections 3 and 4). These instructions are available from 
the authors upon request. 
32 
 
4. At the beginning of each round, the object to be auctioned is randomly drawn by the 
computer from one (virtual) urn containing two objects: one orange object and one 





The colors assigned to players 1, 2 and 3 for the round are determined in a similar 
way. There is one (virtual) urn for each of these three players containing two pieces 
of paper: one orange and one green. The computer randomly (and independently) 
draws one piece of paper from each urn. Each piece of paper is picked with equal 
probability (50%). The piece of paper selected for each player determines that player’s 






5. In each round, each player will make his decisions knowing his preferred color but 
not others’ preferred colors. 
 
 FOR EXAMPLE,  
 if in a round the selected colors for players 1, 2 and 3 are 
 
- Then, player 2 will know                            . In such a case, what player 2 will know 
about the colors of players 1 and 3 is that one of the next four combinations has been 
drawn, each of them with equal probability (25%): 
 
    
 
- An analogous line of reasoning holds for players 1 and 3 (they know only their own 
assigned colors). 
  
6. Initially, no player will know which object (orange or green) has been selected by the 
computer for the round. However, prior to the auction, in sequence, you and the other 
players in the group will have the possibility to become informed of the color of the 
1 1 2 2 3 3 
Player 1’s urn  Player 2’s urn  Player 3’s urn  
(I) (II) (IV) (III) 
1 2 3 
1 2 3 
1 3 1 3 1 3 1 3 
ORANGE OBJECT GREEN OBJECT 
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object to be auctioned by paying 20 ECUs. These decisions will be made according 
to the following sequence: first player 1, then player 2 (knowing player 1’s choice), 
and finally player 3 (knowing player 1’s and player 2’s choices).  
7. The color of the object will be revealed to all those players that have decided to 
become informed (see the previous point). Then, if at least one player has decided to 
acquire the information and at least one player has decided not to acquire it, there will 
be a market for reports. In such a case, prior to the auction, the players that have 
acquired the information will be able to sell a report about the color of the object to 
the uninformed players. In all other cases, all the players will directly participate in 
the auction.   
These are the rules of the market for reports: 
i. First, those players who have acquired the information and that now know the 
color of the object will choose whether to sell a report or not. In case they decide 
to sell a report, these players will set a price (for their report) and all the other 
players will observe this price. 
ii. The price of the report cannot exceed 20 ECUs.  
iii. According to the sequence (player 1 – player 2 – player 3), the uninformed players 
will decide whether to buy one of the reports. When a player makes his choice, 
he will learn the decisions of those players who acted before him/her in the 
sequence.   
iv. The players who have sold a report will decide on the content of the report. The 
content can be as follows: "The object is orange", "The object is green" or "The 
object is orange or green". Thus, the report can contain the true color, contain the 
false one, or be uninformative. 
v. The buyers of the report will receive it. 
When the market for reports finishes, all the players will participate in the auction, 
making a bid for the object. 
8. Auction rules: The player that makes the highest bid will obtain the object. However, 
this player will pay not his bid, but the second-highest bid. The other players will 






For example: If player 1 bids 8 ECUs, player 2 bids 55 ECUs, and player 3 bids 18 
ECUs, then player 2 (the highest bidder) will receive the object and pay 18 ECUs for 
it (the second-highest bid). Players 0, 1 and 3 will neither receive the object nor pay 
anything. 
 
In case of ties in the highest bids, the computer will randomly pick (with equal 
probability) the player who receives the object from among those players who have 
made the highest bid. In such a case, the player who receives the object will pay his 
own bid, and the remaining players will neither receive the object nor pay anything.  
 
For example: If player 1 bids 55 ECUs, player 2 bids 55 ECUs, and player 3 bids 18 
ECUs, then either player 1 or player 2 will obtain the object, with equal probability. 




9. Summary of round payoffs. The round payoff of a player will have three parts:  
a. The player will receive the endowment (250 ECUs) minus the payments (if any) 
incurred either to be informed or to buy a report. 
b. In the event of having sold reports, the player will obtain the agreed price from 
each buyer.  
c. In the event of winning the auctioned object, the player will obtain either 200 
ECUs (if the object is of his assigned color) or 100 ECUs (if it is not) minus his 
payment in the auction. 
 
10. After the auction, and before proceeding to the next round, each player will receive 
the following ex post information:  
a. The bids made by each player in the auction. 
b. The player who obtained the auctioned object and the price paid for it.  
c. The color of the auctioned object. 
d. His round payoff (disaggregated). 
 
11. Payments. At the end of the experiment, you will be paid your payoffs from 4 of the 
20 rounds. These rounds will be randomly selected by the computer. The payoffs that 
you obtained in the selected 4 rounds will be converted into euros at the rate 100 
ECUs = 1 euro and will be paid to you in private. 
 
 
A.2 Experimental instructions for the Hard treatment 
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The instructions of the Hard treatment differ from the instructions of the Soft treatment 
only on point 7. In particular, item iv (dealing with the decision on the content of the 
report) is removed. Instead, we add the sentence “The report reveals the true color of 





B) UNINTERESTED TREATMENTS 
 
In this section, we describe the characteristics and the results of the Uninterested-
20 and Uninterested-10 treatments. 
The informative equilibrium for the game we consider in these two treatments is 
as follows:23 player 0 acquires information and sells a report to two buyers at a price of 
12.5 ECUs. The report sent is always truthful. Thus, two of the players participating in 
the auction learn the true color of the object, and the remaining bidder remains 
uninformed. 
In Table B1, we report the bidding behavior of the different types of players 
(according to the information they hold) in the auction. 
Table B1. Average bids by treatment, type of player and block of 10 rounds 
 
  Uninterested-20 Uninterested-10 









Color - Yes   [Prediction: 200] 144.46^ 191.51 160.73* 195.84 
Color - No    [Prediction: 100] 68.13 90.98 78.21 115.33 
Uninformed 
players      [Prediction: 150] 120.15 141.85 130.14 140.54 
Buyers of 
report 
Content: Color - Yes  
[Prediction: 200] 131.84 161.60 153.76 177.55 
Content: Color - No   
[Prediction: 100] 80.48 84.27 100.43 94.83 
Content: 0                  
[Prediction: 150] 47.33 81.00 30.00 153.29 
Mann-Whitney test significance at *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
t-test significance at ^^^ p<0.01, ^^ p<0.05, ^ p<0.1 
As shown by the reported results of the Mann-Whitney test and t-test, we find that 
there are no systematic significant differences in the bids between treatments by periods 
and type of available information that the subjects have. Moreover, we observe a learning 
pattern common to both treatments (and all types of available information): in the second 
half of the experiment, the bids increase and approach the values from the theoretical 
predictions. 
                                                 
23 See CG for a proof. 
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In Table B2, we describe the observed behavior in the information market. We 
report the choices made by (interested) players regarding the acquisition of information 
by blocks of 10 rounds. 
Table B2. Behavior in information markets in the Uninterested-20 and Uninterested-
10 treatments of interested players – absolute number of observations and relative 
frequencies (% over row total) 
 
Rounds 1-10 Rounds 11–20 

























Unint-20 vs. Unint-10: Mann-Whitney test significance at *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Periods 1-10 vs. 11-20: Signed-rank test significance at ^^^ p<0.01, ^^ p<0.05, ^ p<0.1 
In both treatments, we find that the frequencies of buying a report are much lower than 
the values of the theoretical predictions (66%). These frequencies are very similar across 
treatments in the first 10 rounds (approximately 15%). In the second half of the 
experiment, the frequency of reports bought falls by one-third in treatment Uninterested-
20, whereas it remains stable in treatment Uninterested-10, with the difference between 
both treatments being statistically significant (Mann-Whitney test). Moreover, in both 
treatments, we observe that the modal choice is to remain uninformed and that the 
frequency of this choice increases in the last 10 rounds. 
In Table B3, we report the behavior of the uninterested player (player 0) regarding 
information acquisition by block of 10 rounds. 
Table B3. Behavior in the information market of player 0 in the Uninterested-20 and 
Uninterested-10 treatments – absolute number of observations and relative frequencies 
(% over row total) 
 Rounds 1-10 Rounds 11-20 
 Not informed Informed Not informed Informed 















Unint-20 vs. Unint-10: Mann-Whitney test significance at *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Periods 1-10 vs. 11-20: Signed-rank test significance at ^^^ p<0.01, ^^ p<0.05, ^ p<0.1 
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 Here, on the supply side of reports, we observe remarkable differences between 
the treatments. In Uninterested-10, a high majority of uninterested players choose to 
acquire the information in the first 10 rounds, and this frequency remains stable in the 
latter half of the experiment (above 80%). In the Uninterested-20 treatment, the modal 
choice in the first 10 rounds is still to acquire information, although this frequency 
(approximately 60%) is significantly lower than that in the Uninterested-10 treatment. 
Moreover, this frequency significantly decreases in the second half of the experiment, 
and the modal choice for player 0 becomes to remain uninformed. 
 In Table B4, we describe the informational content of the reports sent for each 
treatment. 
Table B4. Content of the sent report by treatment – absolute number of observations 
and relative frequencies (% over row total) 
Seller 0 report False report Truthful report Total 














Unint-20 vs. Unint-10: Mann-Whitney test significance at *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
We observe that in both treatments, a large majority of the reports are truthful, with this 
frequency being slightly higher in Uninterested-10 (with the difference not being 
statistically significant). 
 In Table B5, we present the (average) asking prices by the sellers of reports in 
the two treatments by blocks of 10 rounds. 
Table B5. Asking price in the market for reports 
 Rounds 1–10 Rounds 11–20 
Unint-20 13.79 13.54 
Unint-10 12.62 12.39 
Unint-20 vs. Unint-10: Mann-Whitney test significance at *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Rounds 1-10 vs. 11–20: Signed-Rank test significance at ^^^p<0.01, ^^ p<0.05, ^ p<0.1 
 We observe that prices are very similar across treatments and stable over time. 
These prices are very close to the theoretical prediction (12.5).  
In Table B6, we describe the (average) accepted prices and acceptance rates in the 
two treatments by blocks of 10 rounds. 
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Table B6. Accepted price and Acceptance rate in the market for reports 
  Rounds 1–10 Rounds 11–20 
Accepted Price Unint-20 12.84 12.23 Unint-10 10.44 11.98 
Acceptance Rate Unint-20 0.203 0.184^ Unint-10 0.139 0.185 
Unint-20 vs. Unint-10: Mann-Whitney test significance at *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Rounds 1-10 vs. 11–20: Signed-Rank test significance at ^^^ p<0.01, ^^ p<0.05, ^ p<0.1 
The accepted price is also quite close to the theoretical prediction in both 
treatments (it is just slightly below the average asking price), with no significant 
differences across treatments or blocks of rounds. Regarding the acceptance rate (that is, 
the frequency of cases in which the seller of information – player 0 – sells at least two 
reports, conditional on buying the information), it is between 14% and 20%, which is far 
below the theoretical prediction (100%). There are no significant differences between 
treatments or blocks of rounds (with the exception of the comparison across blocks of 
rounds in the Unint-20 treatment, which is marginally significant). 
In Table B7, we present the distribution of the number of reports sold (conditional 
on player 0 having acquired information). 
Table B7. Distribution of the number of sold reports 
 0 1 2 3 
Uninterested-20 49 (41.53) 50 (42.37) 16 (13.56) 3 (2.54) 
Uninterested-10 71 (45.51) 69 (44.23) 14 (8.97) 2 (1.28) 
Pearson chi2(3) = 2.1720   Pr = 0.537 
 We observe that the density is concentrated on selling either 0 reports or 1 
report, with roughly the same probability in each treatment. Thus, we observe 
significant deviations from the theoretical prediction, in which 2 reports are sold. 
 In Table B8, we present the average earnings of subjects, depending on the 
treatment, information condition and block of 10 rounds. The most relevant difference 
that we observe in earnings across the two treatments concerns the uninterested players 
who choose to acquire information: their payoff is higher in the Uninterested-10 






Table B8. Average earnings by treatment, type of available information and rounds 
 Uninterested-20 
 Rounds 1–10 Rounds 11–20 
Uninterested (when informed) 239.72 238.73 
Uninformed 268.74 256.35  
Informed 247.17 244.34^ 
Buyers of reports 257.71 251.07  
 Uninterested-10 
 Rounds 1–10 Rounds 11–20 
Uninterested (when informed) 245.47*** 248.73*** 
Uninformed 253.78 251.19  
Informed 252.59 233.30^ 
Buyers of reports 258.62 242.56^ 
Unint-20 vs. Unint-10: Mann-Whitney test significance at *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 




C) BASE TREATMENT 
Here, we present the main experimental results for the Base treatment regarding 
the market for reports. In Table C1, analogous to Table 3 in the main text, we present the 
frequencies of the participants’ choices in the experiment to (i) acquire information in the 
first stage (Inform), (ii) buy a report in the second stage (Buy rep) and (iii) remain 
uninformed (Uninf), distinguishing by mover and by block of 10 rounds. 
Table C1. Behavior in information markets – absolute number of observations and 
relative frequencies (% over row total) 
 Rounds 1-10 Rounds 11-20 
 Uninf. Inform. Buy rep. Uninf. Inform. Buy rep. 












The distribution of available information is very similar to that in the Soft treatment, 
with the same modal choices. In particular, we highlight that the frequency with which 
reports are purchased is also reduced in the second half of the experiment, where we 
find that the market for reports progressively collapses (the average frequency is 6.88%, 
with almost no activity in the last rounds). These results show that as in the Soft 
treatment, the market for reports is never very large and ultimately collapses. 
In Table C2, analogous to Table 4, we present the content of the reports, 
distinguishing between the case in which the seller is interested in the object and the case 
in which he is not interested. 
Table C2. Content of the report by type of seller (interested in the object or 
uninterested) – absolute number of observations and relative frequencies (% over row 
total) 
Seller 0 report False report Truthful report Total 





















 As in the Soft treatment, we observe a high frequency of empty and false reports 
even in situations where a true report is expected. 
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In Table C3, we report the averages of the minimum asking price and accepted 
price observed in the market for reports. Again, these values are consistent with those 
observed in the Soft treatment (see Tables 6 and 7). 
Table C3. Minimum asking price and accepted price in the market for reports 
 Periods 1–10 Periods 11–20 
Minimum asking price 8.83 6.97 








D) REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF SUBJECTS’ BEHAVIOR IN THE 
INFORMATION MARKET 
To provide some further explanations for our findings regarding the different 
performance of the market for reports with hard and soft information, we investigate in 
more detail the determinants of the key decisions in this market: (i) whether to buy a 
report, (ii) whether to post a price for a report and (iii) what content to include in the 
message in the Soft treatment (that is, the quality of the information transmitted). On the 
latter, we should point out that the quite limited size of the market for information in 
treatment Soft prevents a proper statistical analysis of that decision (the total number of 
reports sold is only 71, and only 26 in the second half of the experiment, considerably 
lower than the number of times the game was played (340, as there were 20 iterations per 
group and a total of 17 groups), and much lower than the number predicted by the 
equilibrium considered where a report is sold every time the game is played). In what 
follows, we will thus focus on the first two decisions. 
(i) Regarding the decision to buy reports, notice that to be able to participate as a 
buyer in the market for reports, a subject must have chosen not to acquire information 
directly in the first stage. For this reason, we jointly estimate the Selection equation (the 
probability of not acquiring information in the first stage) and the Buying a report 
equation (the probability of buying a report in the second stage, given that the player did 
not acquire information directly). 
(ii) Regarding the decision to post a price, note that to be able to participate as a 
seller in the market for reports, a subject must have chosen to acquire information directly 
in the first stage. Thus, we jointly estimate the Selection equation (the probability of 
acquiring information in the first stage) and the Posting a price equation (the probability 
of posting a price in the second stage, given that the player did acquire information 
directly). 
Our models (i)-(ii) are quite similar to a Heckman probit estimation (which allows 
for the possibility of correlation between the selection and the report equations, measured 
by parameter Rho in Table D1). In addition, we need to account for the fact that to be able 
to participate in the market for reports, another condition is required. In model (i), at least 
one player in the group must have acquired the information in the first stage and posted a 
price (i.e., there has to be a seller), and in model (ii), at least one player in the group must 
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not have acquired the information in the first stage (i.e., there has to be a buyer).24 We 
cluster standard errors at the group level to account for the correlation arising from the 
fact that a group interacts for 20 periods.25 
Therefore, we estimate 4 models, and the results are reported in Table D1. In 
models (1) and (2), we estimate for the Soft treatment the determinants of the decision to 
buy a report and the determinants of the decision to post a price, respectively. In models 
(3) and (4), we carry out the same analysis for the Hard treatment. In the upper (lower) 
panel of Table D1, we report the estimation results for the corresponding Selection 
equation (respectively, Buying a report, Posting a price). The variables included in the 
Selection equations are: 
- round, a variable that represents the number of iterations of the game (from 1 to 20); 
- info_1, a dummy variable that takes value 1 if the subject acts as mover 2 and the 
predecessor (mover 1) has directly acquired the information and value 0 otherwise; 
- info_12, a variable that takes value 1 if the subject is mover 3 and at least one 
predecessor has directly acquired the information and value 0 otherwise; 
- env|np, a variable that takes value 1 (0) if the subject is (is not) classified either as 
envious or nonprosocial according to his choices in the dictator games described in 
Table E1; 
- risk, a variable that measures how risk loving that player is (represents the amount – 
from 0 to 5 – invested by the subject in the risky asset in the risk test); 
- mover2, a dummy variable that takes value 1 (0) if the subject acts (does not act) as 
mover 2; 
- mover3, a dummy variable that takes value 1 (0) if the subject acts (does not act) as 
mover 3; 
- true_cum, a cumulative variable that reports the difference between the number of 
previous rounds in which the subject bought a report containing a true message and 
the number of previous rounds in which he bought a report containing a false or 
uninformative message (it takes value 0 if the subject has not bought any reports yet); 
and 
                                                 
24 For this reason, we could not use the standard Stata command for Heckman probit estimation, and needed 
to program it ourselves. The program is available upon request.  
25 The Stata program to perform these estimations is available from the authors upon request. 
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- L_acquire_inf, a (lagged) variable that takes value 1 if the subject acquired 
information directly in the previous round, and value 0 otherwise. 
Note that true_cum is intended to capture the effects of previous experience with 
purchasing reports on subsequent information acquisitions. For this reason, it is included 
only in the estimations for the decision to buy a report in the Soft treatment (in the Hard 
treatment, by design, all reports are truthful). 
The variables included in the Buying a report equations are round, env|np, risk, 
true_cum and 
- inf_tot, a variable that measures the number of subjects in the group that directly 
acquired the information (i.e., the number of potential sellers of reports); and 
- askmin, a variable that measures the lowest price posted in the group. 
The variables included in the Posting a price equations are round, inf_tot, env|np, 
risk and 
- noint, a dummy variable that takes value 1 if the subject is not interested in the object 
and 0 otherwise, 
as well as the interactions of this last variable with the antisocial preference variable 
(noint*env|np) and with the risk variable (noint*risk). 
The selection equation of model (1) of Table D1 shows that the probability of not 
acquiring the information directly in the Soft treatment (and therefore of being selected to 
participate as buyers in the market for reports) is increasing in round (significant at 1%). 
Moreover, it shows that the fact that a player acquired the information directly in the 
previous round increases the likelihood that he does the same in the current round (and 
therefore is not selected to act as buyer in the market for reports), as shown by the negative 
and significant coefficient of L_acquire_inf. This confirms what we mentioned earlier. 
The participants in the experiment realize that information quality in the market for 
reports is too low given its price and simply drop out of the market. 
Regarding the Buying a report equation, the main determinants of buying a report 
turn out to be the variables true_cum and askmin. The fact that true_cum is positive and 
significant suggests that previous experiences in the market for reports are important to 
making this decision: subjects who have accumulated bad experiences in the past are less 
likely to buy a report. We also note that the fact that askmin is negative and significant 
shows that higher prices result in less activity in the market for reports (as argued earlier, 
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the prices posted in the Soft treatment turn out to be higher, on average, than the value of 
the information contained in them). Finally, the coefficient of round is negative and 
significant (at the 10% level), showing the decline across rounds of purchases of reports 
in the Soft treatment. Additionally, inf_tot is (marginally) significant, suggesting that 
having two rather than one potential seller of information may increase the probability of 
buying reports. 
Table D1. Market for reports: decision to post a price and decision to buy a report 
 Soft Treatment Hard Treatment 
 Buying a report Posting a price Buying a report Posting a price 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Selection equation 
























































true_cum  0.0073 (0.0731)    







N. Obs. 969 969 912 912 
 Buying a report/Posting a price equation 



































Askmin -0.0702*** (0.0269)  
-0.0632*** 
(0.0245)  
true_cum  0.2250** (0.1029)    
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Noint  -0.1883 (0.4737)  
1.4870*** 
(0.4612) 
noint*env|np   0.4786 (0.4285)  
-0.6594** 
(0.3299) 
noint*risk  -0.0216 (0.0900)  
-0.2086 
(0.1316) 
N. Obs. 447 363 403 396 







***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
If we turn our attention to the decision to post a price in the Soft treatment (model 
(2)), we observe that the Selection equation is almost the ‘inverse mirror image’ of the 
one reported in model (1), reflecting the fact that, basically, those variables that increase 
the probability of being selected to participate as buyers in the market for reports decrease 
the probability of being selected to participate as sellers. In the Posting a price equation, 
only the variable round is significant, showing that the number of subjects who post a 
price decreases over time in the Soft treatment. One may argue these subjects feel 
discouraged by the observed decrease in acceptance rates in the market for reports (see 
Table 7). No other variable is significant, potentially because in the Soft treatment, the 
decision of whether to post a price is not crucial since the seller always has the possibility 
to undo the information transmission by sending an uninformative (or even false) 
message. 
Next, we study the behavior in the Hard treatment, starting with the decision to 
buy a report. The results for model (3) of Table D1 show that the probability of not 
acquiring the information directly is increasing in round and decreasing in L_acquire_inf, 
as in the Soft treatment. However, now the variables info_1 and info_12 are positive, with 
the latter being significant. At first sight, this suggests that the fact that other subjects 
moving earlier directly acquired information reduces the probability that later players 
acquire information. This would be quite reasonable in the Hard treatment, since players 
may be able to purchase truthful information in the market for reports in the later stages, 
potentially at a lower price. The variables mover2 and mover3 are negative and 
significant, suggesting that players that act later in the sequence are more likely to acquire 
direct information (therefore being less likely to act as buyers in the market for reports). 
Note, however, that the net effect of the coefficients of info_12 and mover3 is very close 
to zero, meaning that the probability of mover 3 remaining uninformed is not significantly 
different from that of mover 1 when info_12 equals 1. Conversely, when info_12 equals 
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0, this probability is significantly smaller. Finally, in this case, the variable risk is negative 
and significant, indicating that the more risk lover a player is, the higher the probability 
of acquiring direct information (note that this decision entails the risk of not being able 
to sell reports in subsequent stages). 
Regarding the Buying a report equation of model (3), the variable inf_tot is 
positive and significant, showing that the presence of more sellers of information induces 
more reports to be bought. Though the result is similar to that for the Soft treatment, we 
should point out a difference from the Hard treatment that may be relevant here: having 
two sellers of information – despite this being an out-of-equilibrium event – may now 
mean that neither of them is interested in the object, making the information very 
valuable. Furthermore, env|np is now negative and significant, suggesting that subjects 
with antisocial traits are less likely to buy reports in the Hard treatment. As in treatment 
Soft, ask_min is negative and significant, implying that higher prices reduce purchases of 
reports. 
Finally, we move to the analysis of the decision to post prices in the Hard 
treatment, corresponding to model (4). As in the previous treatment, we observe that the 
Selection equation is almost the ‘inverse mirror image’ of that reported in model (3). 
Regarding the Posting a price equation, recall that the behavior of subjects in this decision 
is one of the most puzzling features observed in the experiment, in light of the theory 
based on the standard preferences we postulated: namely, more than half of the interested 
players sell (hard) information, though this will lead to a significant decline in their own 
payoff in the auction. We see first that the coefficient of the variable noint is positive and 
significant, so that individuals not interested in the object are more likely to post a price. 
It is then particularly of interest to remark that both env|np and the interaction of this 
variable with noint are significant. Adding these two coefficients, we find that env|np has 
a significant effect only if the subject is interested. Thus, having antisocial traits increases 
the likelihood of posting a price when the seller of information is interested in the object. 
Social preferences therefore appear to play a role in explaining the puzzling behavior 
recalled above. An immediate explanation of the mechanism by which social preferences 
may operate is not apparent, and more work is needed to understand it. Here, we can just 
point out that by selling a report, the maximum achievable material gain over the other 
players increases, and subjects with antisocial traits may be attracted by this choice. 
49 
 
Note that the coefficient of risk is positive and significant, though – again looking 
at the opposite sign of the interaction term of this variable with noint – only when the 
seller of information is interested in the object. Hence, risk aversion also affects the 
decision of interested subjects to post a price, in the sense that more risk-averse subjects 
post a price less frequently. A possible explanation is that by selling a report, an interested 
subject faces a “riskier lottery” in the auction stage, and hence, the more risk averse the 
agent is, the less willing he is to post a price. 
Overall, the conclusion is that prosocial preferences appear to be a driver of the 
observed departures from equilibrium behavior in terms of price posting in the Hard 
treatment, while the experience of information being too noisy in the reports received in 





E) RISK AND SOCIAL PREFERENCES TESTS 
 
In the risk test (Charness and Gneezy, 2010), subjects decide how much of their 
endowment (5 euros) to invest in a risky asset and how much to keep. They earn 2.5 times 
the amount invested if the asset is successful (prob. 0.5) and lose the amount invested 
otherwise. 
In Table E1, we report the (dictator) games used for the elicitation of social 
preferences. Each subject had to make four decisions (one of them, randomly chosen, was 
paid). Each decision consists of a choice between distribution 1 and distribution 2. The 
choice of a distribution determines a payoff for the player and a payoff for another player. 
Table E1. Games for the elicitation of social preferences 
Game  





          (I) Prosociality 2: 2 2: 1 
          (II) Costly prosociality 2: 2 3: 1 
          (III) Envy 2: 2 2: 4 
          (IV) Costly envy  2: 2 3: 5 
 
According to the choices in these games, we can classify the subjects according to their 
prosociality and envy attitudes. Regarding prosociality (games I and II), those subjects 
choosing distribution 1 in game I and distribution 2 in game II are classified as weakly 
prosocial, and those choosing distribution 1 in both games are classified as strongly 
prosocial. In contrast, those choosing distribution 2 in both games are classified as 
nonprosocial. Regarding envy (games III and IV), the subjects choosing distribution 1 in 
game III and distribution 2 in game IV are classified as weakly envious, while those 
choosing distribution 1 in both games are classified as strongly envious. Those choosing 
distribution 2 in both games are classified as nonenvious.  
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F) SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL ON THE SOFT AND HARD 
TREATMENTS 
 
In Table F1, we report the average gross payoff in the auction, computed as the 
average of the value of the object minus the price paid for it if the player obtains the object 
and 0 otherwise. Informed players, as predicted, are those that earn more in the auction. 
Moreover, we note a reduction of the auction’s earnings across blocks of periods. This 
reduction is due to the combination of increasing bids (across blocks of periods) and the 
preference of the players to acquire information directly. 
Table F1. Average (gross) payoffs in the auction by treatment, type of available 
information and block of rounds 
 Soft treatment 
 Rounds 1–10 Rounds 11–20 
Uninformed 6.60 1.63 
Informed 15.62 9.69 
Buyers of reports 4.24 5.50 
 Hard treatment 
 Rounds 1–10 Rounds 11–20 
Uninformed 9.23 -3.31 
Informed 24.88 5.46 
Buyers of reports 13.80 3.93 
 
In Figure F1, we depict the histogram for the informational content of reports 
(frequency of true messages) across groups in the Soft treatment. It suggests that there is 
some group variation. 
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Relative frequency of true messages
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In Table F2, we report the content of the received reports in each block of 10 
rounds in the Soft treatment. We observe that the frequency of truthful reports is roughly 
the same in the two halves of the experiment (approximately 50%), so it should not have 
an important impact on payoffs. 
Table F2. Distribution of type of received reports by blocks of rounds in the Soft 
treatment - absolute number of observations and relative frequencies (% over row total) 
 0 report False report Truthful report Total 






















In Table F3, we separate groups into those with high-quality reports (those in 
which more than 50% of reports are truthful) and low-quality reports and show the 
average bids made by the buyers of reports in the auction, categorizing the cases in which 
(i) the content of the report is 0, (ii) the content of the report does not coincide with the 
buyer’s assigned value and (iii) the content of the report coincides with the buyer’s 
assigned value. We report the number of observations within parentheses (as done in 
Table 2 in the main text for all groups). 
Table F3. Average bids of buyers of reports, by average quality of reports in the group, 
































































Focusing on the last 10 rounds, we observe that for those groups with high-quality 
reports, the average bids of buyers of reports are close to the equilibrium values, namely, 
100 when not interested (case (ii)) and 200 if interested (case (iii)); for those with low-
quality reports, the average bid is approximately 150 both when the report indicates that 
the buyer is not interested and when it indicates that she is interested. In any case, the 
number of observations is quite low. 
In Figure F4, we show, for each group, the frequency of true messages (x-axis, 
quality of information) and the number of rounds in which at least one report was sold 
(y-axis) in the Soft treatment. The correlation coefficient (0.25) is not significantly 
different from 0 (p-value 0.35). Thus, we do not find any relationship. 
Figure F4. Relation between the size of the market for reports and the quality of reports 
 
 In Table F5, we explore the number of subjects who directly buy the information 
within groups and how frequently they subsequently post a price in each case in the Hard 
treatment. In the top panel, we report the absolute frequencies of groups by number of 
information acquirers (relative frequencies between parentheses). In the bottom panel, we 
report the frequencies of the decision to post a price in the market for reports, 
differentiating the cases in which the information acquirers are interested in the object 
and the cases in which they are not. 
Table F5. Number of buyers of information within groups and frequencies of posted 
prices in each case in the Hard treatment 
# acquirers in the group 0 1 2 3 







Interested  48/77 81/126   (62.34) (64.29)  












Regarding the number of acquirers within the group, we find that the modal play 
corresponds to just one informed player, as the equilibrium (reported in Proposition 2) 
predicts. However, we also find significant deviations, mainly to two players directly 
acquiring the information. Regarding the decisions to post a price, we note that in all four 
possible scenarios (interested/uninterested agents in the case of one/two directly informed 
agents), the modal choice is to post a price. In this respect, we should note that in the case 
of two potential sellers of information, it pays off to attempt to sell a report even when 
the seller is interested. Moreover, even in the case of only one potential seller of reports, 
if she believes that the other two players will buy a report from her, it requires a price of 
only 12.5 for the information-selling strategy to be better than (the equilibrium one of) 
not selling. 
 In Table F6, we present the frequency of buyers of reports by number of acquirers 
of information in the group (when at least one of them posts a price) in the Hard treatment. 
In the (equilibrium) case of there being one acquirer of information, 43% of the remaining 
players acquire a report (close to the equilibrium frequency of 50%). However, in the 
(out-of-equilibrium) case of there being two acquirers of information, we find a large 
frequency of the remaining agents buying a report (in sharp contrast to the optimal 
behavior in this case of not buying a report). This might be due to some behavioral effect, 
such as an aversion to being the only uninformed person within a group. 
Table F6. Buyers of a report by number of acquirers of information in the group in the 
Hard treatment 
# potential sellers of reports in the group 1 2 
# players who do not buy a report 119 (57.21) 
271 
(21.77) 
# players who buy a report 89 (42.79) 
97 
(78.23) 
Total 208 (100) 
124 
(100) 
 In Table F7, we show the frequencies of players in (the sequence) positions 1, 2 
and 3 adopting the different roles (remaining uninformed, acquiring the information 
directly or buying a report) for both the Soft and Hard treatments. We observe that the 
frequency of players in positions 1, 2 and 3 adopting the different roles are very similar. 
We should, however, point out that actual payoffs are not the same as the theoretical ones, 
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and the informed player obtains the lowest payoff, which may explain why so few of the 
first movers choose to be informed. 
Table F7. Behavior in the information market, by treatment and player position 
  Hard  Soft 
 Mover 1 Mover 2 Mover 3 Mover 1 Mover 2 Mover 3 





148 121 115 
(38.54) (31.51) (29.95) 





163 197 201 
(29.06) (35.12) (35.83) 





29 22 24 
(38.67) (29.33) (32.00) 
 
